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I.

INTRODUCTION

This essay is about change in the common law. More exactly,
it is about how a principle of common-law contracts known as the
“at-will rule” was redefined by the Minnesota Supreme Court in
1
1983 in a case known as Pine River State Bank v. Mettille. That ruling
†
Lawyer (retired), Minneapolis, Minnesota.
B.A., University of
Minnesota, 1964, LL.B., University of Pennsylvania Law School, 1967. Mr. Hedin
is a Fellow of the College of Labor and Employment Lawyers, and a co-founder of
the Minnesota Chapter of the National Employment Lawyers Association. His
email address is dhedin@hotmail.com. This article is dedicated to Andrea
Fichman Rubenstein, who also was present during the creation.
1. 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).
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changed the law of employment relations in Minnesota, it
influenced many other state supreme courts as they too faced
challenges to make archaic common-law principles more
compatible with a modern industrial economy, and it helped bring
about the birth of a new legal discipline, now known as
employment law. This essay describes and explains Pine River’s
influence, primarily through a history of its citations.
II. THE LAW OF “MASTER AND SERVANT” ON THE EVE OF PINE RIVER
When West Publishing Company introduced its “Key-Number
System” in 1908, it placed court rulings in categories ranging from
2
“Abandoned and Lost Property” to “Zoning and Planning.” West
classified litigation between employees and their employers under
the heading “Master and Servant,” and this accurately described
the small body of law for most of the last century. It heavily favored
the master.
In his famous address, The Path of the Law, Justice Holmes
observed:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is
still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid
down have vanished long since, and the rule simply
3
persists from blind imitation of the past.
Though Holmes made these caustic remarks in 1897, he might
well have been writing about the “at-will rule of law” as it stood for
4
most of the next century. According to this rule, either the
employer or the employee is free to quit their relationship at any
time and for any reason. The rule is so short, simple, and clear that
for generations courts repeated it without appending a history of its
origins or attempting to explain its pertinence to contemporary
industrial relations. But it is in the nature of academicians to
accept, if not welcome, Holmes’s challenge to reexamine and not
2. WILLIAM W. MARVIN, WEST PUBLISHING COMPANY: ORIGIN, GROWTH,
LEADERSHIP 79 (1969).
3. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS
167, 187 (1920). Holmes, then serving on the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, delivered this address at the dedication of a hall at Boston
University School of Law on January 8, 1897. Id. at 167.
4. In his address, Holmes made it clear that he was speaking of a particular
obsolete doctrine: “I am thinking of the technical rule as to trespass ab initio, as it
is called, which I attempted to explain in a recent Massachusetts case.” Id. at 187
(citing Commonwealth v. Rubin, 43 N.E. 200 (Mass. 1896)).
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just repeat the common-law principles that judges and lawyers
apply. Accordingly, beginning in the tumultuous 1960s, scholars
began to explore the origins of the rule to see if it realistically
described the status of non-union employees in a modern
economy. One of the first and most influential of these scholarly
endeavors appeared in 1967, when Professor Lawrence E. Blades
published an article advocating relaxation of the at-will rule by
giving employees a tort remedy for what he termed “abusive
5
discharge.”
Professor Blades’s article was published three years after the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Such anti-discrimination
legislation, which restricted employers’ freedom to discharge, was
noted by state courts when they subsequently faced challenges to
the common law at-will rule. Moreover, as implemented by the
Supreme Court, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act had the
unintended effect of accelerating erosion of the rule. In the
6
familiar McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green three-part burden-shifting
paradigm, the employee first makes out a prima facie case of
discrimination, which is followed by the employer’s answer, and
7
concluded by the employee’s rebuttal. Because a prima facie case
8
is relatively easy to prove, the employer usually is required to
explain or justify the action being challenged (typically discharge),
and those reasons must be both “legitimate” and
9
“nondiscriminatory.”
As a practical matter, therefore, an
employer, facing the second step of the McDonnell Douglas test,
cannot risk resting on the at-will rule (i.e., “we were free to fire the
plaintiff without prior notice and for no reason at all, and that’s
10
exactly what we did”).
Long before this, many companies had adopted policies
setting forth the terms, conditions, and benefits of employment.
5. Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting
the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1413 (1967). Blades
was an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Kansas when he wrote this
article. Id. at 1404.
6. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
7. Id. at 802–04.
8. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (“The
burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous.”).
9. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
10. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258 (“[A]lthough the defendant does not bear a
formal burden of persuasion, the defendant nevertheless retains an incentive to
persuade the trier of fact that the employment decision was lawful. Thus, the
defendant normally will attempt to prove the factual basis for its explanation.”).
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While there were sound business reasons for their original
adoption, the civil rights laws and subsequent deluge of litigation
gave them a new importance—by establishing and following
standard operating procedures, typically placed in manuals for
their employees and managers, employers could minimize the
chance that illicit bias would motivate a particular decision on
hiring, promotion, or discharge. One purpose of these rules,
therefore, was to instill in the workforce the belief that they would
be enforced uniformly, not selectively. Subsequent court rulings
11
relaxing the at-will rule noticed this goal of equality of treatment,
and they support one thesis of this essay—while the roots of
employment law are many, the deepest lie in the civil rights
12
movement, not in the organized labor movement.
11. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 894–95,
897 (Mich. 1980) (“Employers can make known to their employees that personnel
policies are subject to unilateral changes by the employer. Employees would then
have no legitimate expectation that any particular policy will continue in force.
Employees could, however, legitimately expect that policies in force at any given
time will be uniformly applied to all. . . . An employer who only selectively
enforces rules or policies may not rely on the principle that a breach of a rule is a
breach of the contract, there being in practice no real rule. An employee
discharged for violating a selectively enforced rule or policy would be permitted to
have the jury access whether his violation of the rule or policy amounted to good
cause. Rules and policies uniformly applied are, however, as much a part of the
‘common law of the job’ and a part of the employment contract as a promise [in a
handbook] to discharge only for cause.”); Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc.,
491 A.2d 1257, 1269 (N.J. 1985), modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985) (“Here the
question of good cause is made considerably easier to deal with in view of the fact
that the agreement applies to the entire workforce, and the workforce itself is
rather large. Even-handedness and equality of treatment will make the issue in
most cases far from complex . . . .”). In this embryonic stage of wrongful discharge
law, one court adopted a theory of liability that was influenced by the prohibition
against sex discrimination in civil rights legislation. In Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.,
316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974), the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that a female
employee who was fired for refusing to date her supervisor stated a common law
claim for malicious discharge. Only a few years later, those facts would give rise to
a claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment under state and federal antidiscrimination laws.
12. Nevertheless, the influence of the labor movement on the employee
rights movement is apparent. For example, the “just cause” standard in collective
bargaining agreements is identical to provisions in personnel manuals which state
supreme courts construed to relax the at-will rule in the 1980s. Borrowing a
critical feature of labor contracts, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded its
ruling in Toussaint with the suggestion that non-union employers adopt a policy of
“binding arbitration” on “cause and damages” to extract themselves from what it
called the “perils” of the jury system. 292 N.W.2d at 897. There is an enormous
amount of literature on whether it is advisable for employers to force non-union
employees to arbitrate employment-related claims, as suggested by the Michigan

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss1/6

4

Hedin: A Citation History of Pine River State Bank v. Mettille: a Study
7. HEDIN - RC - REFORMAT 3.DOC

2006]

PINE RIVER STATE BANK V. METTILLE

11/20/2006 3:27:34 PM

301

During these times, there were scattered signs of unease about
the at-will rule in the states. In 1959, the California Court of
Appeal held that a worker who was fired because he refused his
employer’s order to commit perjury before a legislative committee
stated a claim for wrongful dismissal—the first of what became
13
known as the “public policy exception” to the at-will rule. In the
next two decades, there was a trickle of state court rulings
recognizing employee wrongful discharge suits, usually in
14
particularly egregious situations. In 1980, in Touissant v. Blue Cross
15
& Blue Shield of Michigan, the Michigan Supreme Court upheld
jury verdicts in favor of non-union employees who were discharged
in violation of “just cause” provisions in personnel manuals issued
16
by their employers.
Two years later, in Weiner v. McGraw-Hill,
17
18
Inc., New York’s highest court issued a similar ruling.
There were parallel developments in constitutional law. In
19
1968, in Pickering v. Board of Education, the United States Supreme
Court held that a public employee who expressed his views about
important public issues was protected from reprisal by his employer
20
by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Four years
Supreme Court; however, the movement has not made much headway. One
reason is that federal courts (and arbitrators) have ruled that the common law atwill rule is abrogated by a contractual clause mandating arbitration—in other
words, the arbitration clause implies a just cause standard for dismissal.
PaineWebber, Inc. v. Agron, 49 F.3d 347, 352 (8th Cir. 1995); Shearson Hayden
Stone, Inc. v. Liang, 653 F.2d 310, 312–13 (7th Cir. 1981).
13. Petermann v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
This case is thought to be the beginning of the employee rights movement, but at
the time it likely was motivated by considerations of intra-governmental relations—
the judiciary wanted to preserve the integrity of proceedings before the legislative
branch.
14. Several of these cases were logical extensions of Petermann. E.g. Tameny v.
Atl. Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980) (employee fired after refusing to
participate in illegal price-fixing scheme stated claim for retaliatory discharge);
Frampton v. Cent. Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973) (employee fired for
applying for workers’ compensation benefits had claim for retaliatory discharge).
15. 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980).
16. Id. at 885.
17. 443 N.E.2d 441 (N.Y. 1982).
18. Id. at 445 (“[A]n agreement on the part of an employer not to dismiss an
employee except for ‘good and sufficient cause only’ and, if such cause was given,
until the prescribed procedures to rehabilitate had failed, does not create an
ineluctable employment at will.”).
19. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
20. Id. at 574. This was followed by Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983)
(absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate
forum in which to review the termination of a public employee speaking not as a
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later, in Perry v. Sindermann, the Court held that a state college’s
faculty guide gave a teacher who had served under ten one-year
contracts a property right to continued employment that could not
be taken away without the due process guaranteed by the
21
Fourteenth Amendment.
In Minnesota, at the beginning of the 1980s, the at-will rule
was, seemingly, rock-solid substantive law. The leading case was
22
Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., where the state supreme court
rejected a contract claim by a professional engineer who accepted a
promise of “permanent employment” by a paper company, turned
down another job offer, closed his business, moved from
Minneapolis to Grand Rapids where he bought a house, and was
23
fired two years later. The ruling was issued in 1936, when courts
were loath to place additional economic burdens on struggling
enterprises. Decades later, in the early 1960s, the Minnesota
Supreme Court twice rejected suits by employees alleging that they
were fired in breach of the provisions of their employers’ personnel
24
manuals.
Subsequently, it ruled in favor of employees in two
25
unusual cases. In Bussard v. College of Saint Thomas, the court held
that a priest’s gift of stock in a publisher of a religious magazine,
worth $350,000, constituted “additional consideration” for
“permanent employment” by the recipient, a college—which
26
simply meant that he could be discharged only for good cause.
The court went behind labels, which figure predominately in this
27
area of law, and examined Rev. Bussard’s “unique” circumstances.
28
And in Grouse v. Group Health Plan, the court imprinted a
citizen upon matters of public concern, but as an employee upon matters only of
personal interest) and Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 681 (1994) (“An employee
who makes an unprotected statement is not immunized from discipline by the fact
that this statement is surrounded by protected statements.”).
21. 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972). The Supreme Court decided a companion case
the same day. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (holding that the
professor had no protected interest in continued employment because he had
completed his contracted-for term and, therefore, was not protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment).
22. 197 Minn. 291, 266 N.W. 872 (1936) (Olson, J.).
23. Id. at 294–95, 266 N.W. at 874.
24. Cederstrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 263 Minn. 520, 537, 117 N.W.2d 213, 224
(1962) (Rogosheske, J.); Degen v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 260 Minn. 424,
428–30, 110 N.W.2d 863, 866–67 (1961) (Thomas Gallagher, J.).
25. 294 Minn. 215, 200 N.W.2d 155 (1972) (Peterson, J.).
26. Id. at 228, 200 N.W.2d at 163.
27. Id. at 225–26, 200 N.W.2d at 162.
28. 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981) (Otis, J.).
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promissory estoppel analysis on the familiar “lure away” scenario to
give the plaintiff a cause of action against a company that broke a
29
promise to him of new employment.
To Group Health’s
argument that under the at-will rule, it could have fired Grouse on
his first day of work, the supreme court disagreed and held that it
was required to give him a “good faith opportunity to show he
30
could perform his duties.”
III. THE REPUTATION OF THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT ON THE
EVE OF PINE RIVER
Whether a particular court ruling becomes influential depends
in part on whether that court is well regarded by its peers. The
decision of a state court with a high reputation is likely to be cited
31
more frequently by other state courts. A ruling by a prestigious
court may be cited by other courts because it is persuasive and
helps explain why the citing court reached the conclusion it did, or
that court may merely cite the ruling of another to justify or
32
“legitimate” its own decision in a developing area of law.
In 1983, on the eve of Pine River, the Minnesota Supreme
Court was one of the nation’s elite courts. In one widely cited
academic study of the “prestige” of state supreme courts published
33
that year, Minnesota’s ranked eleventh. It also had a reputation
29. Id. at 116. Grouse quit a pharmacist position he held at Richter Drug
after accepting a job offer from Group Health, which withdrew it before he could
start work, leaving him jobless. Id. at 115–16. Grouse’s two-count suit against
Group Health alleged breach of contract and negligence. See Appellant’s Brief
and Appendix at A-3–A-6, Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114
(Minn. 1981) (No. 51128). The supreme court, on its own, imposed a promissory
estoppel theory of liability on Grouse’s suit. Grouse, 306 N.W.2d at 116. A decade
later, it did this again in a celebrated case, which lead to an unexpected result. See
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990) (Simonett, J.), rev’d,
501 U.S. 663 (1991), on remand, 479 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. 1992) (Simonett, J.).
30. Grouse, 306 N.W.2d at 116.
31. David J. Walsh, On the Meaning and Patterns of Legal Citations: Evidence from
State Wrongful Discharge Precedent Cases, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 337, 340 (1997)
(“Courts intent on legitimation can be expected to cite prestigious courts most
often, regardless of the substance of those elite courts’ decisions. Ultimately, the
sheer number of citations and prestige of cited courts may be more important
from the standpoint of legitimation than any close correspondence between the
holdings of the cited and citing courts.”).
32. Id.
33. Gregory A. Caldeira, On the Reputation of State Courts, 5 POL. BEHAV. 83, 89
(1983). Caldeira’s methodology was quite simple. He counted the number of
citations each of the state supreme courts made in 1975. The percentage of this
total of each supreme court was then computed. He then created an “expected
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as an “activist” court. In a study of post-World War II innovation in
tort law by state supreme courts, Minnesota and New Hampshire
34
tied for tenth.
A court ruling may also have influence if its author is well
35
regarded by other jurists and in the legal community at large. In
1983, Associate Justice John E. Simonett, the author of Pine River,
had yet to make his reputation as a judge. He had served on the
court less than three years—too brief a time to establish a
36
reputation. By the time of his departure from the court in 1994,
however, he was regarded by the bar—and likely will be by future
37
legal historians—as one of this state’s greatest jurists. Pine River is
one of the foundation blocks of his high stature.
IV. THE COMPETITION
In business, a product that reaches the marketplace first
score” for each supreme court, that is, “the percentage of references it should
have received if judges were inserting citations on a random basis.” Id. at 88.
Using this as a “baseline,” he subtracted the expected from the actual percentage
of references for each court, which yielded positive and negative deviations. “This
number, then, serves as the dependent phenomena—judicial reputation.” Id. at
92. In two earlier studies of state supreme court reputation or “prestige,”
Minnesota ranked twelfth in 1920 and eighth in 1936. See id.; Rodney L. Mott,
Judicial Influence, 30 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 205, 314 (1936).
However, in another more subjective survey published in 1973 that rated
entire state court systems on their “legal professionalism” (defined to include their
methods of judicial selection, structure, administrative apparatus, terms of office,
and compensation), Minnesota’s came in at the midpoint. HENRY R. GLICK &
KENNETH N. VINES, STATE COURT SYSTEMS 12 (Prentice-Hill 1973). Idaho,
Minnesota, and Oklahoma received composite scores of twelve, placing them at
numbers twenty-two through twenty-four among the fifty state court systems. Id.
California ranked first with a composite score of 21.7, and Mississippi was last with
3.4. Id.
34. Lawrence Baum & Bradley C. Canon, State Supreme Courts as Activists: New
Doctrines in the Law of Torts, in STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLICYMAKERS IN THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 83, 98 (Mary Cornelia Porter & G. Alan Tarr, eds., 1982). The
rankings were based on how many of fourteen “innovations” in tort doctrine were
adopted by a particular court. Id. The innovations included limitations on
sovereign immunity, reform of products liability rules, family-related issues such as
abrogation of interspousal and parent-child immunities, and the right of privacy,
among others. Id. (charting innovative techniques discussed in the chapter). The
states ranked at the top were New Jersey, Michigan, Kentucky, and California. Id.
35. See generally, David Klein & Darby Morrisroe, The Prestige and Influence of
Individual Judges on the U. S. Courts of Appeals, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 371 (1999).
36. Simonett was appointed by Governor Albert Quie in 1980. Donna
Halvorsen, John Simonett’s Legacy is One of High Wit and Deep Wisdom, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), June 6, 1994, at 1B.
37. Simonett resigned in 1994. Id.
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benefits from its novelty. It can build a base of loyal customers
before competition arrives. Similarly, in law, a “leading case” is
frequently the first—but not always. Occasionally that first court,
while recognizing that the conditions which called a common-law
doctrine into being cease to exist, struggles to forge a new
approach to the problem. The next court may rework that initial
ruling to create a more practical resolution, one that persuades the
courts of other states. In the early 1980s, there were three products
vying for leadership in the swiftly changing field of employment
38
contract law—Toussaint, Weiner, and Pine River.
Of the three, the Toussaint decision came first—but it was not
the first state supreme court ruling holding an employer liable for
breaking promises in its handbook. Four months before Toussaint,
the New Mexico Supreme Court, in an opinion of only six
paragraphs, held that the termination procedures in an employer’s
39
policy guide were an implied employment contract.
It went
unnoticed. In contrast, Toussaint was a struggle that caught the
attention of commentators and courts when it was finished. The
first indication of this is the notation on the first page of the
published decision, which states that the Michigan Supreme Court
heard arguments on December 5, 1978 and issued its decision on
June 10, 1980, a remarkably long gestation period for a court
40
ruling. The court was badly fractured. In search of authority,
both the majority and dissent dug deeply into moss-covered
nineteenth century “master and servant” law. Each side dissected
ad nauseam a Depression-era case that concerned a claim for
41
“permanent employment” not unlike Skagerberg. Pulling out all
42
the stops, the majority quoted Perry v. Sindermann, while the
38. There were a scattering of similar rulings, but none had the influence of
this trio.
39. Forrester v. Parker, 606 P.2d 191, 192 (N.M. 1980).
40. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 880
(Mich. 1980). Two cases were consolidated on appeal in Toussaint, Charles
Toussaint’s suit against Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan and Walter Ebling’s
suit against Masco Corporation. Both men won jury trials. The Michigan appeals
court reversed Toussaint, but affirmed Ebling. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Mich., 262 N.W.2d 848, 853 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977); Ebling v. Masco
Corp., 261 N.W.2d 74, 77 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977). A four-member majority of the
Michigan Supreme Court reversed the appeals court in Toussaint, reinstating the
jury verdict, and it affirmed Ebling. 292 N.W.2d at 883. Three other members of
that court concurred in Ebling, but dissented in Toussaint. 292 N.W.2d at 880.
41. Lynas v. Maxwell Farms, 273 N.W. 315 (Mich. 1937).
42. Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 894 (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,
601–03 (1972)).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006

9

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 6
7. HEDIN - RC - REFORMAT 3.DOC

306

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

11/20/2006 3:27:34 PM

[Vol. 33:1

dissent turned to Thomas M. Cooley, a state supreme court justice
43
and noted treatise writer in the Gilded Age. When the majority
emerged from these meanderings, it stated its holdings:
1) a provision of an employment contract providing that
an employee shall not be discharged except for cause is
legally enforceable although the contract is not for a
definite term—the term is “indefinite,” and
2) such a provision may become part of the contract
either by express agreement, oral or written, or as a result
of an employee’s legitimate expectations grounded in an
44
employer’s policy statements.
The court later described how an employee’s “legitimate
expectations” might arise, but in doing so, it disregarded the fact
that the employees in Toussaint received promises that they would
not be discharged without cause before they started work:
No pre-employment negotiations need take place and the
parties’ minds need not meet on the subject; nor does it
matter that the employee knows nothing of the particulars
of the employer’s policies and practices or that the
employer may change them unilaterally. It is enough that
the employer chooses, presumably in its own interest, to
create an environment in which the employee believes
that, whatever the personnel policies and practices, they
are established and official at any given time, purport to
be fair, and are applied consistently and uniformly to each
employee. The employer has then created a situation
45
“instinct with an obligation.”
In the following years, this expansive dictum attracted some courts
and troubled others.
The next case, Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., seems to have had
the least influence on other state courts. The reason lies in its facts
and the narrow body of case law it cited. Weiner, already working
at another publishing company, was approached by McGraw-Hill to
43. Id. at 907. Cooley served on the Michigan Supreme Court from 1864 to
1885. The standard works on Cooley are CLYDE E. JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE
COURTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THOMAS M. COOLEY, CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, AND
JOHN F. DILLON UPON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1954) and ALAN R. JONES,
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONSERVATISM OF THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY: A STUDY IN THE
HISTORY OF IDEAS (1987) (publication of 1960 Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Michigan). A recent study of Cooley appears in PAUL D. CARRINGTON, STEWARDS OF
DEMOCRACY: LAW AS A PUBLIC PROFESSION (1999).
44. Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 885.
45. Id. at 892 (citations omitted).
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join it; to make its offer more attractive, McGraw-Hill assured him
46
The
that he would not be terminated without “just cause.”
47
company’s handbook promised that as well. After eight years of
employment, Weiner was suddenly cashiered, triggering his suit for
48
McGraw-Hill’s motion to dismiss on the
breach of contract.
49
pleadings was denied and an appeal taken. Construing the facts
most favorably to Weiner, the non-moving party, a majority of the
New York Court of Appeals held that he stated a claim and
50
remanded his case for trial.
The pre-hiring negotiations between the litigants permitted
other state supreme courts to view Weiner as a unique, fact-bound
case. The majority in Weiner relegated Toussaint and several foreign
cases to a footnote and referred dismissively to their “less than
51
conventional theories” of contract law. Aside from these citations
and a few to professional articles, both the majority and dissent in
Weiner relied entirely on New York precedent to reach their
conclusions. Stylistically, the majority’s opinion was taut and highly
polished—the converse of Toussaint.
Weiner differed from Toussaint in another important respect—
it gave a thumbnail sketch of the history of the at-will rule:
[B]y way of background, it is of interest to observe that
the at-will employment rule, which originated centuries
ago as an adjunct to the law of master and servant in
England, in later times was to find a receptive legal
environment in laissez-faire nineteenth century America.
So strong indeed was the turn-of-the-century legal and
socioeconomic philosophy that nurtured it that for long
Federal constitutional law deferred to it as well. But,
significantly, starting approximately in the days of the
Great Depression in the early nineteen thirties and
continuing through the present, though political,
scholarly and industrial agitation for modification of the
rule to provide greater job security has been insistent,
52
there is growing support for remedial legislat[ion].
46. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 442 (N.Y. 1982).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 443.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 446.
51. Id. at 443 n.3, 446 n.7.
52. Id. at 443–44 (citations omitted). When courts such as Weiner traced the
origins of the at-will rule and reexamined it in the context of late twentieth
century workplace relations, they were able to do so without using stilted and
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Outside New York, Weiner occasionally appears in string cites
by other courts, yet it is rarely quoted. Its explanation of the
origins of the at-will rule—particularly coupling it to discredited
Lochner-era constitutionalism—may have encouraged the courts of
sister states to relax the at-will rule. However, its importance comes
from the fact that it reached the same conclusion as Toussaint and
Pine River. If the Court of Appeals of New York—one of the most
prestigious and influential state courts—had dismissed Weiner’s
suit, the development of employment law in this country would
have been much different.
Of the first major state supreme court decisions holding that
an employer’s personnel policies can modify the common law atwill relationship, Pine River came last, and it became the most
influential.
V. THE LITIGANTS, THE JUDGE, THE TRIAL
When remanding a suit involving a “sharp bid” in a sealed
auction for the ownership of a newspaper in 1980, Simonett
concluded his opinion for a unanimous court with a detached
observation: “At trial, the legal theories and issues may develop
differently. Whether a party is likely to prevail at trial is not a
53
consideration here.” He could not make such a statement in Pine
River because it had already been tried by a jury. If it had been
appealed from a judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment,
or a directed verdict, he would have written differently, and his
opinion would not have had the influence it did.
It started as a run-of-the-mill collection case. Richard Mettille
took out several real estate and personal loans during the twentyone months he worked as a loan officer at the Pine River State
54
Bank. When an auditor found deficiencies in his paperwork, the
55
bank fired him. After he refused to repay the loans, the bank sued
56
him in Cass County District Court.
It is the nature of collection

politically charged terms such as “labor” and “capital,” which were current in the
Populist, Progressive, and New Deal periods. This change in discourse was due, in
part, to the ideals and the spirit of 1960s Civil Rights legislation and the Civil
Rights era in general.
53. Short v. Sun Newspapers, Inc., 300 N.W.2d 781, 790 (Minn. 1980)
(citation omitted).
54. Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 624–25 (Minn. 1983).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 625.
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litigation that the debtor seeks some leverage to bargain with the
lender. Mettille’s lawyer, aware of Toussaint, sought refuge in a
handbook that was issued to his client a few weeks after he began
work. He brought a two-count counterclaim against the bank: first,
57
breach of contract —the contract being the handbook—and
second, a tort claim that the “Bank’s conduct was so grossly
negligent and wrongful and was further intentional, causing
Mettille to suffer personal humiliation and defamation of his credit
58
and his family’s credit.”
The case was assigned to the docket of Judge John Spellacy,
sitting in Grand Rapids. Before his appointment to the district
court in 1974, Spellacy had been a trial lawyer for a quarter
century, and insurance companies seem to have been an important
part of his clientele; he was fifty-six years old when he presided over
59
Pine River.
The case was tried to a jury in January 1982; before trial,
60
Spellacy dismissed Mettille’s mishmash tort claim. He directed a
verdict for the bank on its claims and offset the jury’s verdict in
favor of Mettille by that amount, leaving the latter with a judgment
61
of $24,141.07. He denied both parties’ motions for a new trial
and attached an eight-page memorandum explaining his
62
reasoning.
Spellacy’s memorandum, though unusually selfrevelatory, even provocative, was an important chapter in this
litigation:
I conceded from the start that in following the recent case
of the Michigan Supreme Court, Toussaint v. Blue Cross
(1980), 408 Mich. 579, 292 NW2d 880, I was going well
beyond existing Minnesota employment contract law.
57. Id.
58. Appellant’s Brief and Appendix at A-6, Pine River State Bank v. Mettille,
333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983) (No. 82-543).
59. Spellacy’s “official” biography reads: “John A. Spellacy, Grand Rapids.
Born February 3, 1925, Hibbing; education: University of Minnesota (LL.B., J.D.);
Lt. (jg.), U.S. Navy (World War II); twenty-five years as a practicing lawyer,
primarily trial work; member: Int’l Academy of Trial Judges, Order of the Colif
[sic]; fellow, Int’l Society of Barristers; American Board of Trial Advocates; Ass’n
of Insurance Attorneys; Int’l Ass’n of Insurance Counsel; board of governors,
Minnesota State Bar Ass’n; past pres., Itasca County and Fifteenth District Bar
Assns.; chief judge, Ninth Judicial District; married; four children. Appointed
March 1, 1974, elected 1976.” JOAN ANDERSON GROWE, MINNESOTA SECRETARY OF
STATE, MINNESOTA LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 367 (1981–1982).
60. Appellant’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 58, at A-25.
61. Id. at A-22, A-25.
62. Id. at A-22.
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One of the pure thrills enjoyed by a trial Judge is the
opportunity to aid in the orderly development and
progression of the law. The present Minnesota Supreme
Court, to its credit, has never been accused of adamantly
refusing to discard outmoded past precedent. . . . I admit
that the rule I’ve applied is contrary to the cases relied
upon by the plaintiff: Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., 197
Mn. 291, 266 NW 872; Degen v. Investors Diversified Services,
Inc., 260 Mn. 424, 110 NW2d 863; Cederstrand v. Lutheran
Brotherhood, 263 Mn. 520, 1117 NW2d 213; Lundeen v. Cozy
Cab Mfg., 288 Mn. 78, 179 NW2d 73. Any attempt to
harmonize these cases is an exercise in futility. However,
Cederstrand contains some interesting observations by
Justice Rogesheske, by all odds one of the members of the
63
Court renowned for his compassion.
After quoting dicta from Cederstrand, which he described as “a
64
lengthy, 17 page struggle to uphold precedent,” Spellacy
continued:
I further concede that Bussard v. College of St. Thomas, 294
Mn. 215, 200 NW2d 155, and Grouse v. Group Health Plan,
Inc., (Mn. 1981) 306 NW2d 114, while decided in favor of
the employees, are distinguishable in that the employees
furnished express, new consideration in exchange for job
security. Indeed, the language in Grouse is not nearly as
65
supportive as Justice Rogesheske’s in Cederstrand.
And he concluded on a highly personal note, one that reminds
us that the fellowship of the bench is small and intimate:
I strongly suspect that Justice Rogesheske would have
enjoyed the fact situation in Toussaint and in the case
before me so that he could, indeed, find an enforceable,
unilateral modification of a non-union employee’s
contract so as to permit a fact finder to award damages for
66
wrongful termination. That is all I have done.
63. Id. at A-26.
64. Id. at A-27.
65. Id.
66. Id. at A-30 (emphasis in original). We do not know whether Justice
Rogesheske would have followed the path Spellacy blazed in his memorandum,
but we do know that his replacement did. Walter Rogesheske served as associate
justice from 1962 to 1980, when he resigned. He was replaced by John Simonett.
They both came from Little Falls. Realizing these relationships brings to mind
Simonett’s best known writing: John E. Simonett, The Common Law of Morrison
County, 49 A.B.A.J. 263 (1963). On the surface, it is a whimsical piece, yet on
closer reading, it can be seen as expressing his deeply held views on the
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As it turned out, not one of the reasons Spellacy advanced in
his memorandum—certainly not his sharp break with precedent—
found its way into Simonett’s final opinion; yet, he had seen the
need for change in this stagnant area of law, and he boldly
challenged the supreme court to follow him and the Cass County
jury. The following year, the Minnesota Supreme Court took only a
slightly different path to reach the same conclusion that Judge
Spellacy had: an employer’s handbook may be an “enforceable,
unilateral modification of a non-union employee’s contract so as to
67
permit a fact finder to award damages for wrongful termination.”
VI.

THE DECISION IN PINE RIVER

To appeal Judge Spellacy’s ruling, the Pine River State Bank
68
retained one of the premier appellate firms in the state. Mettille,
69
not surprisingly, stuck with his trial counsel. By now it was clear
that the stakes in this litigation were very large. In its brief, the
bank advocated adherence to the at-will rule, citing Skagerberg,
70
Cederstrand, and Degen. If the appeal was to be decided on the
basis of stare decisis, the bank would win. Mettille’s brief cited
recent law review articles advocating reform of the at-will rule, state
statutes already limiting the employer’s freedom to discharge, and
dozens of wrongful discharge decisions from various jurisdictions
71
around the country. Few times in the supreme court’s history has
importance of the professional mores and customs that complement book-law as
well as the special place of the law—and the lawyer and the judge—in the
community.
67. Appellant’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 58, at A-30 (emphasis in
original).
68. Meagher, Geer, Markham, Anderson, Adamson, Flaskamp & Brennan,
Minneapolis, joined the bank’s trial counsel, Lundrigan, Hendricks & Lundrigan,
Pine River, for the appeal. See Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 624.
69. Throughout the litigation, Mettille was represented by Stephen R. Van
Drake of Van Drake & Van Drake, Brainerd. See Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 624.
70. Respondent’s Brief and Appendix at 12–18, Pine River State Bank v.
Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983) (No. 82-543).
71. A comparison of the citations in the briefs of the two sides shows the stark
differences in their approach to precedent.

Bank
Mettille

Citations by Source
Minnesota Cases
Foreign Cases
18
11
16
70

Law Reviews
1
8

The bank also cited Prosser’s treatise on torts, and Mettille cited Blackstone’s
Commentaries once.
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the preference for continuity and stability in the common law
clashed so openly with its need to change, to stay close to the
realities of society, as in this appeal.
John E. Simonett was assigned to write the court’s opinion. He
was almost fifty-nine years old at the time. He had practiced as a
trial lawyer from 1951 to 1980 in Little Falls in partnership with
Gordon Rosenmeier, a dominating figure in the Minnesota
72
legislature from the 1940s through the 1960s.
In an interview
after being appointed to the court in 1980, Simonett described his
73
judicial philosophy as “pragmatic.”
Pine River reflects his
philosophy of judicial pragmatism.
An influential opinion is usually well-written. If such an
opinion necessarily has substance, the style in which that substance
is expressed is critical to its success. Simonett had a distinct style of
74
writing. His discussion of a case sometimes had literary overtones.
He seems to have been uncomfortable making the sweeping
declarations about society, the human condition, and similar
matters which some judges find irresistible. At times, his style
becomes relaxed, even conversational. He frequently started a
75
76
paragraph, “It appears to us,” or “We believe,” thus suggesting

72. Memorial Service for Gordon Rosenmeier on January 21, 1989, in THE
JUDICIAL CAREER OF JOHN E. SIMONETT (Marvin Roger Anderson & Susan K.
Larson, eds. 1998) (Minnesota Justices Series No. 11).
73. Douglas R. Heidenreich, Justice John Simonett, 50 THE HENNEPIN LAW. 9
(Sept.–Oct. 1980). Richard Posner has given twelve “generalizations” about “legal
pragmatism.” For our purposes, six stand out: “1. Legal pragmatism . . . involves
consideration of systemic and not just case-specific consequences . . . . 3. The
ultimate criterion of pragmatic adjudication is reasonableness . . . . 5. Legal
pragmatism is forward-looking, regarding adherence to past decisions as a
(qualified) necessity rather than as an ethical duty . . . . 7. Legal pragmatism is
empiricist . . . . 8. Therefore it is not hostile to all theory . . . . Legal pragmatism is
hostile to the idea of using abstract moral and political theory to guide judicial
decisionmaking. 9. The pragmatic judge tends to favor narrow over broad
grounds of decision in the early stages of the evolution of a legal doctrine.”
RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 59–60 (2003).
74. Several of Simonett’s extra-judicial writings concerned literary aspects of a
judicial opinion. See, e.g., John E. Simonett, The Footnote as Excursion and Diversion,
55 A.B.A.J. 1141 (1969) (praising “exclusionary footnotes” in legal writing); John
E. Simonett, The Use of the Term ‘Result-Oriented’ to Characterize Appellate Decisions, 10
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 187 (1984) (discussing the positive and negative aspects of
“result-oriented” judicial decisions).
75. Short v. Sun Newspapers, Inc., 300 N.W.2d 781, 787 (Minn. 1980)
(dispute over sealed bidding process).
76. In re Petitions of Space Ctr., Inc., 302 N.W.2d 17, 22 (Minn. 1981) (tax
case).
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there are other views of the situation. In Miller v. Shugart, a
famous insurance case, he began the dispositional paragraph by
asking, “This leaves us with the question of what to do in this
78
case.”
His casual question invited readers—there, hard-nosed
personal injury lawyers—into the deliberative process. Of course,
he knew what should be done with Miller’s case, but only a judge
79
with a complete command of insurance law could write like that.
The danger of this style of opinion writing is that it reveals the
highly subjective nature of the job of judging. Shrewdly, Simonett
did not follow this style in Pine River.
Pine River is only nine pages long. Its statement of the facts is
about two pages, and it concludes with another two pages fielding
objections to the trial court’s jury instructions and evidentiary
rulings. The legal analysis occupies less than five pages and
proceeds like chapters in a text book on contract law—offer,
acceptance, consideration.
The progressive disciplinary
procedures in an employer’s handbook distributed to its workforce
are nothing more than an offer, and employees who continue
80
working thereby accept that offer and supply consideration. The
at-will rule, Simonett writes, is “only a rule of contract
construction,” a “presumption” that can be overcome by contrary
evidence, not a “rule imposing substantive limits to the formation
81
of a contract.”
For Simonett, like Holmes, the repetition of a
phrase was no substitute for clear thought; reexamining the at-will
rule, he saw that it still performed an important function in
employment relations and so he demoted it from a rule of
substantive law, which it clearly was in earlier decisions of the court,
to a rebuttable presumption.

77. 316 N.W.2d 729 (Minn. 1982).
78. Id. at 736.
79. See generally, John E. Simonett, Release of Joint Tortfeasors: Use of the Pierringer
Release in Minnesota, 3 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1 (1977) (arguing that Minnesota law
and policy embraced the adoption of the Pierringer release); John E. Simonett &
David J. Sargent, The Minnesota Plan: A Responsible Alternative to No-Fault Insurance,
55 MINN. L. REV. 991 (1971) (criticizing the proposed “no fault” legislation in
Minnesota and advocating reform of the current fault system).
80. Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626–27 (Minn. 1983).
Simonett reaffirmed that an objective standard determined contract formation.
Id. at 626. He avoided discussing whether the parties had a “meeting of the
minds,” which divided the Michigan Supreme Court in Toussaint. See id. For the
“faulty etymology” of this attractive alliteration, see E. Allan Farnsworth, “Meaning”
in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L. J. 939, 943–45 (1967).
81. Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 628.
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In a critical passage, Simonett declares that his court will
follow a policy of judicial self-restraint—it will not interfere with the
decision by the employer to restrict its own freedom to act
arbitrarily: “There is no reason why the at-will presumption needs
to be construed as a limit on the parties’ freedom to contract. If
the parties choose to provide in their employment contract of an
indefinite duration for provisions of job security, they should be
82
able to do so.”
Here, Simonett masked the boldness of his ruling in a laissezfaire cloak. Crafting it in this subtle fashion, he had no need to
discuss the origins of the rule or its applicability to modern
industrial relations, though the four law review articles he cited did
83
so.
Simonett broke with the status quo, but in a decidedly
unoriginal way. His opinion gives the appearance of merely
applying several traditional contract principles to an everyday
controversy in the workplace; yet, the final product is innovative
and fresh. He did not openly revolt against precedent, as did Judge
Spellacy; rather than overrule Cederstrand and Degen, he culled
black-letter principles from both to support his analysis and then
84
disingenuously distinguished them by their facts. While he cites

82. Id. Toussaint made this same point, though more laboriously. Toussaint
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 891 (Mich. 1980). Aside
from its rhetorical force, there is considerable irony in this passage from Pine River.
“Freedom of contract” was once a central feature of laissez-faire capitalism. Justice
Sutherland famously said that it was “the general rule and restraint the exception”
when he struck down the District of Columbia’s minimum wage act in Adkins v.
Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 546 (1923). Laid to rest in the constitutional
revolution of the mid-1930s, this concept suddenly reappears in 1983 in Pine River
to give workers, usually considered exploited and lacking judicial favor in the old
regime, new claims of job security against their employers who, we are led to
believe, have voluntarily chosen to restrict their own freedom of action.
83. Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting
the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967); Joseph
DeGuiseppe, Jr., The Effect of the Employment-at-will Rule on Employee Rights to Job
Security and Fringe Benefits, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (1981); Employment Contracts of
Unspecified Duration, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 107 (1942); Protecting At Will Employees
Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1816 (1980).
84. Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 626–27. After giving abbreviated versions of the
facts of these cases, Simonett summed up: “It is clear that the Pine River State
Bank’s handbook, both with respect to its content and its dissemination, differs
markedly from the situations in Cederstrand and Degen.” Id. at 627 n. 4. To the
contrary, what is clear is that if these cases had arisen post-Pine River, they would
have survived summary judgment.
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85

both Toussaint and Weiner, his opinion differs from them in the
number and breadth of his authorities. He has a far-ranging
interest in how other courts and academic scholars were
approaching the problem of reforming the at-will rule. In addition
86
to law reviews, an ALR, and Restatements, he cites twenty-five
separate cases, some more than once, and they are about evenly
divided: thirteen are from the Minnesota Supreme Court and
twelve are from other state and federal courts, all relatively recent
rulings. The variety of anchors in Pine River gave it distinct
advantages over its competition.
VII.

EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT LITIGATION AFTER PINE RIVER

Two months before Pine River, the supreme court recognized
the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress in Hubbard v.
87
United Press International. Chief Justice Douglas Amdahl’s opinion
for the court in that matter suggests that the first assault on the
citadel of the at-will rule may have been successful, in part, because
88
it sounded in contract, not tort. The result in Hubbard was not
unexpected; the court had discussed the tort only three years
89
earlier.
But it was a reluctant recognition. The Chief Justice
dwelled on the common law’s concern about the authenticity of
claims of emotional distress that did not accompany a physical
90
injury.
He might have acknowledged the increased ability of
85. Id. at 629, 631 n.7. Simonett distinguished Toussaint on its facts: “We do
not think, however, that Toussaint, which was relied on by respondent and the trial
court, aids particularly in construing Mettille’s contract. Id. at 631 n.7. In
Toussaint the employees, in accepting employment, had been explicitly assured,
both orally and in an employer’s manual, that termination would require good
cause, so that good-cause termination was a negotiated item of the employees’
contracts.” Id. In dictum, however, the Michigan Supreme Court noted that the
pre-employment job security assurances were not necessary to its holding: “No preemployment negotiations need take place and the parties’ minds need not meet
on the subject.” Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
86. Simonett cited the Restatement (Second) of Agency (1971) once and the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) three times. Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at
628–30. He also cited Michael A. DiSabatino, Annotation, Modern Status of Rule
That Employer May Discharge At-will Employee For Any Reason, 12 A.L.R.4th 544
(1982). Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 630.
87. 330 N.W.2d 428, 438 (Minn. 1983).
88. See generally Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d 428 (overturning and dismissing a jury
verdict for the Plaintiff on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim).
89. Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123, 129–30 (Minn. 1980) (Sheran, C.J.).
90. Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 437–38. Needless to say, though a Hennepin
County jury had found UPI guilty of outrageous conduct, after reviewing the facts,
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mental health professionals to verify emotional injuries or even
society’s greater knowledge of mental illness, but he did not. His
skepticism has never washed off this tort. Though adopted over
two decades ago, recoveries for the tort of outrage in Minnesota
91
can be counted on the fingers of one hand.
There was no need for Simonett to sound a warning about
feigned mental anguish allegations in Pine River because in an
action for breach of contract in Minnesota, as in most states,
emotional distress damages cannot be recovered. Nor can punitive
damages. Thus, the court limited Mettille’s recovery against the
92
bank to his wage loss, offset by the amount of his debt to the bank.
If contract litigation met initial success in challenging the atwill rule, it also was the easiest for employers to defeat in future
battles. In Pine River, Simonett gave comfort to employers by
advising them that they could change their handbooks when
93
needed.
Over time, most of them added a conspicuous
Amdahl concluded that its treatment of Hubbard was not so extreme as to be
“utterly intolerable to the civilized community,” one of the elements of the tort.
Id. at 439.
91. Cf. Michael K. Steenson, The Anatomy of Emotional Distress Claims in
Minnesota, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 38–39 (1993) (“Claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress and defamation are increasingly common in cases
where the employer discharges an employee or otherwise takes action affecting
the employee’s job status. Whether the claim is for defamation or the intentional
infliction of emotional distress, the Minnesota Supreme Court has been reluctant
to expand tort remedies to supplement the traditional contract remedies available
to discharged employees. One of the factors that appears to be at work in cases
such as Hubbard, even if not explicitly stated, is the desire to avoid that
expansion.”) (citations omitted).
92. “The measure of damages for breach of an employment contract is the
compensation which an employee who has been wrongfully discharged would
have received had the contract been carried out according to its terms.” Pine
River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 632 (Minn. 1983) (quoting Zeller v.
Prior Lake Pub. Schs., 259 Minn. 487, 493, 108 N.W.2d 602, 606 (1961)). The
court dismissed Mettille’s tort claim for mental distress before trial. Appellant’s
Brief and Appendix, supra note 58, at A-25. Mettille’s final judgment against the
bank totaled only $24,141.07, plus interest. Id. at A-22.
93. Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 627 (“Unilateral contract modification of the
employment contract may be a repetitive process. Language in the handbook
itself may reserve discretion to the employer in certain matters or reserve the right
to amend or modify the handbook provisions.”). In Toussaint, the Michigan
Supreme Court suggested that an employer may choose not to have any personnel
policies at all. See Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 894. Simonett did not hold out such
an illusion. He undoubtedly was aware that this option was closed three years
earlier in Continental Can Co. v. State, 297 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. 1980) (Kelly, J.),
where the supreme court recognized a claim for sexual harassment under the
Minnesota Human Rights Act. The court stated that one means of avoiding
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“disclaimer” that declared that the handbook was not a contract,
that its provisions could be changed, and that employees who
received it served on an “at-will” basis. With a few exceptions,
courts in Minnesota have not enforced a handbook with a
disclaimer against the employer. As a result, pure Pine River
94
contract suits virtually ceased to exist by the end of the century.
The most radical effort after Pine River to use contract
principles to reform the at-will employment relationship, imposing
a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in unilateral employment
contracts, was rejected by the supreme court in Hunt v. IBM Mid
95
America Employees Federal Credit Union. While unavailable in most
discharge suits, the covenant exists, sub rosa, in common law benefit
cases—that is, suits alleging that the employer fired an employee to
avoid paying some other type of compensation, usually a
96
commission.
liability for workplace harassment was for the employer to disseminate a policy
prohibiting harassment to its workers. Id. at 248, 250. A harassment policy
typically is placed in an employee handbook.
94. Michaelson v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 474 N.W.2d 174, 180 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1991) (citing cases), aff’d mem., 479 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1992). See also Feges v.
Perkins Rests., Inc., 483 N.W.2d 701, 708 (Minn. 1992).
95. 384 N.W.2d 853, 858–59 (Minn. 1986). But see Nordling v. N. States
Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 503 (Minn. 1991) (“This court has not made clear
whether it recognizes such a cause of action, but there is no need to go into the
question here. After a careful review of the record, we conclude as a matter of law
that no covenant could in any event exist in this case.”). The question of whether
the covenant exists in an individually negotiated express employment contract
remains open in Minnesota (because the typical employee in such a situation is a
professionally trained and licensed individual in whom the employer has placed
considerable trust and responsibility, it is likely that the supreme court could read
the covenant into their particular compact).
96. After the Second World War, there were a handful of what may be called
pre-Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) benefits cases. These
were successful contract suits by employees to recover bonuses, severance pay and
even retirement pay an employer promised them if they satisfied certain
conditions, but then refused after the employees performed. These cases held
that an employer could not renege on such a commitment at its will, and were
sometimes cited by courts relaxing the at-will rule in the 1980s. In Minnesota,
Hartung v. Billmeier, 243 Minn. 148, 66 N.W.2d 784 (1954) (Matson, J.) (enforcing
employer’s promise of a yearly $100 bonus to employee if he worked at least five
years), cited in Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 627, falls within this small category, as do
Holman v. CPT Corp., 457 N.W.2d 740, 744 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (citing Buysee v.
Paine, Weber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 623 F.2d 1244, 1249 (8th Cir. 1980)) and
Bratton v. Menard, Inc., 438 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). The most
famous early case explicitly holding that an employer’s discharge of an employee
to avoid paying a benefit violated a covenant of good faith and fair dealing is
Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977), which was cited
by Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 443 n.3 (N.Y. 1982)).
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If Hunt slammed one door shut, it seemed to open another.
Holding that the handbook relied upon by Hunt was by itself too
97
indefinite to constitute an offer to him, the court emphasized that
he was relying solely on the manual as a basis for his contract
98
action. Oddly, given this judicial hint, few attempts have been
made by employees in Minnesota to combine documentation with
oral representations and a course of conduct by the employer as a
99
basis for a contract action. The most noteworthy of these cases
was Martens v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co., where a
plurality of the state supreme court held that a company’s
brochures, as well as oral statements by its managers concerning a
system of compensation and promotion, were too indefinite to
100
constitute a contract as a matter of law. In striking contrast, most
97. Hunt v. IBM Mid Am. Employees Fed. Credit Union, 384 N.W.2d 853, 857
(Minn. 1986).
98. Id. at 856–57. In Pine River, Simonett noted that “[n]ot every utterance of
an employer is binding.” 333 N.W.2d at 630. This observation has sometimes
been quoted by courts when disallowing an employee’s contract claim; however, it
can also be interpreted as suggesting that in a particular case a multiplicity of
utterances about job security by the employer will be binding. There can be little
doubt that Justice Simonett would have welcomed what became known as the “all
factors test” for determining the nature of a common law employment contract.
In his article, The Use of the Term “Result-Oriented” to Characterize Appellate Decisions,
Simonett noted the century-long trend for appellate courts to decide cases less on
the basis of general legal principles and more on their individual facts; and as an
example, he cited the adoption of a “totality of the circumstances” test for warrants
in criminal cases. John E. Simonett, The Use of the Term “Result-Oriented” to
Characterize Appellate Decisions, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 189, 209 nn.66–67 (1984)
(citations omitted). As another example, he might have noted his court’s
redefinition of the “at-will rule” from one of substantive limitation on employeremployee relations to an evidentiary presumption in Pine River.
99. Oral promises of an employer formed binding contracts in Hartung, 243
Minn. 148, 66 N.W.2d 784, and Maschenik v. Park Nicollet Medical Center, 385
N.W.2d 362 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (employee told about written grievance
procedure before hire, but was never given a copy). The Minnesota Court of
Appeals has explicitly adopted an “all factors” test when interpreting the
Minnesota Business Corporation Act, which instructs a court when resolving an
intra-corporate dispute to “take into consideration the . . . reasonable expectations
of all shareholders as they exist at the inception and develop during the course of
the shareholders’ relationship with the corporation and with each other.” MINN.
STAT. § 302A.751, subdiv. 3a (2004). The appeals court has written, “When
ascertaining the [parties’] intent, trial courts must consider the written and oral
negotiations of the parties as well as the parties’ situation, the type of employment
and the particular circumstances of the case.” Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798,
803 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). See also Pedro v. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1990).
100. 616 N.W.2d 732 (Minn. 2000) (Anderson & Gilbert, JJ., dissenting). For
the plurality, Justice Edward C. Stringer cited Cederstrand v. Lutheran Brotherhood,
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other state supreme courts, some of which originally followed the
lead of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Pine River, have adopted a
101
totality of circumstances test for contract formation.
In 1991, an appeal came before the supreme court which
263 Minn. 520, 523, 117 N.W.2d 213, 216 (1962), Degen v. Investors Diversified
Services, Inc., 260 Minn. 424, 425, 428, 110 N.W.2d 863, 864–66 (1961), and dusted
off the Depression-era Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., 197 Minn. 291, 294–95, 266
N.W. 872, 874 (1936) to prop up his conclusion that the plaintiffs’ suit should be
dismissed under Rule 12. Martens, 616 N.W.2d at 741–42. The plurality’s analysis
was devoid of the wide-ranging interest in scholarly and foreign authorities that
was a hallmark of Simonett’s work in Pine River. Even Justice Gilbert, writing in
dissent, did not cite authority from beyond Minnesota’s borders for his conclusion
that the plaintiffs should have the opportunity to engage in discovery to prove an
agreement “bound up in a myriad of representations spanning some fifty years of
3M’s history.” Id. at 753 (Gilbert, J., dissenting).
101. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals suggests that the “all factors
test” is the majority rule. Adkins v. Inco Alloys Int’l, Inc., 417 S.E.2d 910, 914–15
(W. Va. 1992) (citing cases). See also Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 710
P.2d 1025, 1036–38 (Ariz. 1985) (specific promissory language not essential to
formation of implied contract; parties’ intent to be discerned from totality of
statements and actions). In a case cited favorably in Pine River, the California
Court of Appeals wrote, “[w]hile oblique language will not, standing alone, be
sufficient to establish agreement . . . it is appropriate to consider the totality of the
parties’ relationship . . . .” Pugh v. See’s Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927 (Ct.
App. 1981). See Weiner, 443 N.E.2d at 446 (“In determining whether such a
presumption [of at-will employment] is overcome here, the trier of the facts will
have to consider the ‘course of conduct’ of the parties, ‘including their writings’
. . . and their antecedent negotiations. . . . [I]t is not McGraw’s subjective intent,
nor ‘any single act, phrase or other expression’ but ‘the totality of all of these,
given the attendant circumstances, the situation of the parties, and the objectives
they were striving to attain,’ which will control.” (citations omitted)). See also
Wright v. Honda Mfg., Inc., 653 N.E.2d 381, 384 (Ohio 1995) (“[I]t is important
for the trier of fact to review the history of relations between the employer and
employee and the ‘facts and circumstances’ surrounding the employment-at-will
relationship. These ‘facts and circumstances’ include ‘the character of the
employment, custom, the course of dealing between the parties, company policy,
or any other fact which may illuminate the question . . . .’ [I]n addition . . . such
evidence . . . includes . . . that information contained in employee handbooks, oral
representations made by supervisory personnel that employees have been
promised job security in exchange for good performance, and written assurances
reflecting company policy.” (citations omitted)). See also Berube v. Fashion Ctr.,
Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1044 (Utah 1989) (“[E]mployment contracts should be
construed to give effect to the intent of the parties. An implied-in-fact promise is a
judicial attempt to reach precisely that result. The conclusion that a promise
exists may arise from a variety of sources, including the conduct of the parties,
announced personnel policies, practices of that particular trade or industry, or
other circumstances which show the existence of such a promise.” (citations
omitted)). For some courts, a handbook disclaimer is just one factor among many
to be considered when deciding whether a contract has been formed. See, e.g.,
McGinnis v. Honeywell, Inc., 791 P.2d 452, 457 (N.M. 1990); Johnson v. Morton
Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1005 (Utah 1991) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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permitted Simonett to return to Pine River. It was the multi-count
wrongful discharge claim of Gail Nordling, a career in-house
attorney at an electrical utility, on appeal from summary
102
judgment.
Nordling claimed that when he was discharged, his
employer violated the procedures in its handbook and engaged in
reprisal for his objection to what he thought was illegal surveillance
of other employees, and he further claimed that his supervisor
103
tortiously interfered with his employment contract.
Simonett, speaking for the full court, reinstated Nordling’s
104
contract and tortious interference claims.
He took note of the
transformation of the profession from single practitioners or
“relatively small partnerships”—not unlike his practice for nearly
three decades in the firm of Rosenmeier & Simonett—to
105
specialized practices and “salaried employment lawyers.”
He saw
that for many purposes Nordling’s employer treated him as a
106
salaried worker.
He concluded that the common-law rule that a
lawyer could be fired by a client for any reason and be entitled to
recover only quantum meruit was out-of-date for a salaried lawyer107
employee.
While holding that Nordling could hold his exemployer liable for disregarding its progressive disciplinary system
108
when it fired him, Simonett was highly sensitive to preserving the
109
confidential relations between staff lawyer and employer-client.
A model of appellate writing, Nordling is one of Simonett’s finest
opinions.
VIII. PINE RIVER IN THE COURTS OF MINNESOTA
Practicing lawyers quickly took advantage of Pine River.
Initially, there were many suits like Hunt—one count complaints
alleging that the employer violated the graduated disciplinary
procedures in its handbook when it fired the plaintiff. But its
influence was soon felt in other types of employment litigation—
retaliatory discharge cases, unemployment compensation claims,
and discrimination suits, among others.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Nordling v. N. States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 500 (Minn. 1991).
Id.
Id. at 499.
Id. at 501–02.
Id. at 502.
See id.
Id. at 503.
Id. at 502–03.
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One measure of a case’s influence is the number of times it is
cited by other courts. As Daniel A. Farber has written,
Clearly, a host of extraneous factors can influence the
number of citations that an opinion receives. In general,
however, citation impact is a plausible measure of the
significance of an opinion, that is, how far it ‘moves’ the
law. An opinion that contributes little new information
about the law will not be very useful to later courts, nor
will it usually be of much interest to commentators. Thus
citation frequency provides at least a rough measure of
110
how significantly an opinion changes the law.
The following is a tabulation of the number of reported
decisions citing Pine River between 1983 and 2005 by Minnesota
appellate courts and by federal courts applying Minnesota law in
diversity cases or in federal cases with a pendent state contract
111
Each of these courts turned to Pine River as authority for
claim.
deciding some issue or for declaring some proposition in its
opinion.

25

Citations By Minnesota Appellate Courts, Minnesota Federal
District Court, and 8th Circuit Court of Appeals

20
15
10
5

20
05

20
03

20
01

19
99

19
97

19
95

19
93

19
91

19
89

19
87

19
85

19
83

0

110. Daniel A. Farber, Earthquakes and Tremors in Statutory Interpretation: An
Empirical Study of the Dynamics of Interpretation, 89 MINN. L. REV. 848, 852 (2005).
111. Our methodology was quite simple. We conducted a Westlaw search of
Pine River, and counted all cases citing Pine River issued by the Minnesota Supreme
Court, the Minnesota Court of Appeals, United States District Courts for the
District of Minnesota, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals between 1983 and
December 31, 2005. The results appear in the table. A hard copy of the Westlaw
tabulation is on file with the William Mitchell Law Review.
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Gross numbers of citations such as these, however, “are at best
112
Yet, if they
a crude and rough proxy for measuring influence.”
say something, but not much, about Pine River’s influence, they tell
a great deal more about the explosion of litigation it ignited.
During this period, Pine River affected the outcomes of many cases
that were not reported. There were rulings in small claims court in
actions to recover wages or commissions and administrative awards
113
on claims for unemployment compensation. In the folklore of
the trial bar and the insurance industry, for every case that is tried,
114
nine or more are settled. The percentage of settlements is much
higher in employment law. This is because the at-will rule, even if
only a presumption, favors the employer. Few claims by employees
are ever placed into suit; most settle pre-suit on a confidential
115
basis.
The number of cases, claims, and situations that were
influenced by Pine River in any year from 1983 through 2005 in the
state of Minnesota is closer to thirty times the number of citations
recorded for that year in this table—and this is a conservative
estimate.
The bar graph of citations to Pine River in Minnesota courts
resembles a ski jump, though a descending roller coaster ride may
be a more apt metaphor. In fact, it is typical of the citation
histories of most significant court rulings. They are cited most
frequently soon after they are published, less so over time. This is
the process of the “aging” of judicial authorities or the
116
“depreciation” of legal capital. Yet, while this process may be true
of cases in general, the question remains as to what causes a
112. William M. Landes et al., Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal
Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 271 (1998).
113. In 1984, the Minnesota Court of Appeals, applying Pine River, held that an
employee who is fired in violation of the disciplinary procedures in the employer’s
handbook cannot be denied unemployment compensation. Hoemberg v. Watco
Publishers, Inc., 343 N.W.2d 676, 678 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). See also Neubert v.
St. Mary’s Hosp. & Nursing Ctr. of Detroit Lakes, 365 N.W.2d 780, 782 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985). In subsequent years, dozens of similar claims were resolved
administratively, and not always to the benefit of the claimant.
114. HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 66 (1982) (citing
H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE
CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT (1970)).
115. For example, in the two decades after Pine River, many employees were
able to negotiate confidential severance packages before filing suit by arguing that
the manner of their discharge violated their employers’ own policies.
116. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 262–63 (1976). Borrowing a phrase from
nuclear physics, they suggest that a case has a limited “half-life.” Id. at 259.
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particular case to lose influence—in other words, are there
external events, occurring outside the chambers of a judge
searching for authority for an opinion, which cause a particular
case to diminish in influence?
There are several external causes of the waning impact of Pine
River, as measured by its frequency of citation. First, employers
learned to follow their own rules when disciplining and dismissing
117
employees.
Next, they took Simonett’s suggestion and amended
their manuals to include a broad disclaimer, thus creating a
defense to a Pine River claim. They also learned the advantages of
having a departing worker sign a general release as part of a
modest severance package. Finally, state appellate courts applied
Pine River to a variety of situations in published opinions, thereby
reducing the uncertainty that unnerves practicing lawyers as they
endeavor to predict to their clients how a court or agency will rule
118
in a particular situation.
A byproduct of a lawyer’s greater
certainty of judgment is less litigation—and fewer opportunities for
later courts to cite Pine River.
IX.

PINE RIVER AMONG THE STATES

In 1988, the New Hampshire Supreme Court faced the
question of the enforceability of an employer’s manual in a

117. This is related to two other phenomena of the 1980s: the preventive law
programs of large law firms, which sought to educate corporate clients about
developments in employment law, and second, continuing legal education courses
during which practicing lawyers learned the lessons of Pine River and advised their
clients accordingly. The Minnesota Supreme Court adopted a policy on
mandatory minimum CLE credits for practicing lawyers in 1975.
118. The Minnesota Supreme Court addressed Pine River issues twice in 1986:
Hunt v. IBM Mid America Employees Federal Credit Union, 384 N.W.2d 853 (Minn.
1986), and Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 389 N.W.2d 876, 892–93 (Minn.
1986) (Simonett, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); once in 1991 in
Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991), and again in
1992 in Feges v. Perkins Restaurants., Inc., 483 N.W.2d 701 (Minn. 1992). The
appeals court decided a raft of cases in the years immediately following Pine River,
each incrementally advancing the bar’s understanding: in 1984, Hoemberg, 343
N.W.2d 676; in 1985, Neubert, 365 N.W.2d 780, and Tobias v. Montgomery Ward &
Co., 362 N.W.2d 380 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); in 1986, Brookshaw v. South St. Paul
Feed, Inc., 381 N.W.2d 33 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), Fitzgerald v. Norwest Corp., 382
N.W.2d 290 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), Maschenik v. Park Nicollet Medical Center, 385
N.W.2d 362 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), and Kulkay v. Allied Central Stores, Inc., 398
N.W.2d 573 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); in 1987, Skramstad v. Otter Tail County, 417
N.W.2d 124 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), and Herron v. Green Tree Acceptance, Inc., 411
N.W.2d 192 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
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wrongful discharge action. Writing for the court, Justice David
Souter surveyed the judicial landscape and concluded: “Judicial
responses to actions for the enforcement of job security provisions
119
contained in handbooks fall into four broad categories.”
He cited only one case, Pine River, as exemplifying the first
category of cases which enforced manuals “if, but only if, they
satisfy generally applicable standards of unilateral contract
120
He placed Toussaint and Woolley v. Hoffmann-La
formation.”
Roche, a 1985 decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court, into the
second category, which recognized the “enforceability of the
handbook’s statement of policy, but without so clearly requiring
121
compliance with unilateral contract rules.”
The third category
relied upon a theory of promissory estoppel, while the fourth
122
rejected all efforts to modify the at-will rule. After holding that a
manual should be enforced if certain conditions were met, Souter
concluded: “Our holding is in line with Pine River State Bank v.
Mettille, not with the arguably interventionistic passages in Woolley v.
123
Hoffmann-LaRoche.”
Like Souter, many state courts cited both Toussaint and Pine
River and less frequently Weiner, while holding that the terms of a
handbook could limit an employer’s right to discharge its
employees at will. Because of this, bar graphs of the citation
histories of Toussaint, Weiner, and Pine River will mirror one
another, with the number of cites to Weiner far less than its
competitors. The following table lists the number of cases in which
other state courts (primarily state supreme courts) cited Pine River
124
in the United States from 1983 through 2005. The total comes to
125
125 separate decisions by appellate courts in thirty-six states.
119. Panto v. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 547 A.2d 260, 266 (N.H. 1988).
120. Id.
121. Id. (citing Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d
880, 892 (Mich. 1980) and Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257,
1264, 1268 (N.J. 1985)).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 268.
124. For our methodology, see supra note 111. The cases that were tabulated
for this table appear in a Westlaw search of all cases citing Pine River from 1983
through December 31, 2005 by courts in states other than Minnesota. Except for a
few cites by state trial courts such as the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, all
cites are from appellate courts in other states. The tabulations for this graph are
on file with the William Mitchell Law Review.
125. Appellate courts in the following states did not cite Pine River during this
period: Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi,
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Citations By Other State Courts
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There are, however, different ways to cite a case.
It is one
thing for a case to be one of many in a block of cites supporting a
proposition, still another for that case to be quoted. When one
state supreme court quotes the opinion of another state supreme
court, that act signifies that the quoted case is particularly
127
influential. Pine River was widely quoted, and this is a sure sign of
its influence.
In 1983, several months after Pine River appeared, the
Nebraska Supreme Court quoted it with approval: “We agree with
the reasoning of the Minnesota Supreme Court that [the
employer’s] argument enlarges the at-will rule to impose
128
substantive limits on the formation of contracts.” The next year,
the Arizona Supreme Court quoted Pine River: “We agree with the
Minnesota Supreme Court that ‘[i]f the parties choose to provide
in their employment contract of indefinite duration for provisions
129
In a short ruling,
of job security, they should be able to do so.’”
issued in 1985, the Vermont Supreme Court quoted Pine River’s
Montana, Nevada, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Tennessee. See supra
note 124 and accompanying text. A tabulation of the states whose appellate courts
have cited Pine River is on file with the William Mitchell Law Review.
126. See generally David J. Walsh, On the Meaning and Pattern of Legal Citations:
Evidence from State Wrongful Discharge Precedent Cases, 31 LAW & SOC. REV. 337
(1997).
127. Id. at 342.
128. Morris v. Lutheran Med. Ctr., 340 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Neb. 1983). Four
years later, in Johnson v. Panhandle Co-op Ass’n, 408 N.W.2d 261, 266 (Neb. 1987), it
quoted Pine River at length, concluding, “We agree with the reasoning of the
Minnesota court.”
129. Leikvold v. Valley View Cmty. Hosp., 688 P.2d 170, 173 (Ariz. 1984).
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holding that the “at-will rule . . . is . . . a rule of . . . construction”
and concurred with its suggestion that a court need not interfere if
the parties wished to contract limitations of the employer’s ability
130
to discharge.
In 1987, the Arkansas Supreme Court, while acknowledging
Toussaint and Pine River, rebuffed an attempt to hold the employer
to its promises in its handbook, while a dissent called the majority’s
strict adherence to the at-will rule “archaic and in need of
131
revision.” Four years later, the full court reversed course, quoting
long passages from Pine River, and when the issue rose years later, it
132
The West Virginia
returned to Pine River, quoting it once more.
Supreme Court quoted Pine River in two cases and cited it in three
133
others as it developed this body of law over a period of ten years.
The South Dakota Supreme Court quoted the decision of the
Minnesota Supreme Court in Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,
134
which in turn was based on Pine River.
It is noteworthy that other courts quoted Pine River for a variety
of propositions. The Connecticut Supreme Court quoted Pine
River’s holding that “additional consideration” was but one sign of
130. Sherman v. Rutland Hosp., Inc., 500 A.2d 230, 232 (Vt. 1985). Years later,
in a curious case, the Vermont Supreme Court, after announcing its decision to
“join the many courts” that have held that a personnel manual may modify an atwill relationship, string-cited six decisions that included Pine River and Toussaint
and then inexplicably announced, “We recognize that this holding draws on
aspects of both unilateral contract formation and promissory estoppel.” Taylor v.
Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 652 A.2d 466, 471 (Vt. 1994). The court then quoted with
approval a long passage from Toussaint, which it described as “the leading case.”
Id.
131. Gladden v. Ark. Children’s Hosp., 728 S.W.2d 501, 503 (Ark. 1987). In a
stinging dissent to this decision, Associate Justice John T. Purtle summarized the
history of employment relations over the previous century in three sentences:
“After the abolishment of slavery in 1865 the employment relationship became
known as ‘master-servant.’ As late as 1968 this Court determined that a ‘servant’ is
an employee whose physical conduct is subject to the master’s . . . control. We
have now elevated the relationship to one of ‘employer-employee.’” Id. at 505
(Purtle, J. dissenting) (citations omitted).
132. Crain Indus., Inc. v. Cass, 810 S.W.2d 910, 914–15 (Ark. 1991); Sexton
Law Firm, P.A. v. Milligan, 948 S.W.2d 388, 393–94 (Ark. 1997).
133. The West Virginia Supreme Court quoted Pine River in Cook v. Heck’s Inc.,
342 S.E.2d 453, 458–59 (W. Va. 1986) and Adkins v. Inco Alloys International, Inc.,
417 S.E.2d 910, 914 (W. Va. 1992). It also cited Pine River in Williamson v. Sharvest
Management Co., 415 S.E.2d 271, 274 (W. Va. 1992), Hogue v. Cecil I. Walker
Machinery Co., 431 S.E.2d 687, 689 (W. Va. 1993), and Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc.,
459 S.E.2d 329, 340 (W. Va. 1995).
134. Bauer v. Am. Freight Sys., Inc., 422 N.W.2d 435, 438 (S.D. 1988) (quoting
Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 883 (Minn. 1986)).
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the parties’ intent, and that the at-will rule is a rule of construction
135
The
of an employment contract, not a substantive requirement.
Utah Supreme Court cited Pine River’s repudiation of the alleged
136
need for “mutuality of obligation” under a contract.
The North Dakota Supreme Court initially cited both Pine
River and Toussaint and did not distinguish their different
approaches to the problem. However, as the issues recurred, its
analyses became more sophisticated, and in the end Pine River
prevailed over its competitor. In 1984, the North Dakota Supreme
Court held for the first time that an employer could be held liable
for disregarding the dismissal provisions in its personnel manual,
137
Four years later, the issue rose
citing Pine River and Toussaint.
again. In a less perfunctory analysis, the North Dakota Supreme
Court quoted Pine River’s statement that a unilateral contract can
138
be changed and the new conditions become part of that contract.
It did not cite Toussaint. In each of the next three cases involving
unilateral contract issues, the court cited Pine River but not
139
Toussaint.
To be sure, other state supreme courts quoted Toussaint. The
140
New Jersey Supreme Court cited Pine River but quoted Toussaint
141
in Woolley.
This approach was followed by the Alaska Supreme
142
Court in a 1989 decision and by the New Mexico Supreme Court

135. Coelho v. Posi-Seal Int’l, Inc., 544 A.2d 170, 175 (Conn. 1988). On this
point the Supreme Court of Connecticut noted that “the Minnesota Supreme
Court adopted the Littell rule.” Id. (referencing Littell v. Evening Star Newspaper
Co., 120 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1941), cited in Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333
N.W.2d 622, 629 (Minn. 1983)).
136. Berube v. Fashion Ctr., Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1045 (Utah 1989) (quoting
Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 629). The Berube court also cited Weiner v. McGraw-Hill,
Inc. for the same proposition. Id. (citing 443 N.E.2d 441, 444–45 (N.Y. 1982)).
137. Hammond v. N.D. State Pers. Bd., 345 N.W.2d 359, 361 (N.D. 1984). It
also cited a lower court from Pennsylvania and one of its own decisions from 1972.
Id.
138. Sadler v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 431 N.W.2d 296, 298 (N.D. 1988)
(quoting 333 N.W.2d at 627).
139. Aaland v. Lake Region Grain Co-op., 511 N.W.2d 244, 246 (N.D. 1994);
Pratt v. Heartview Found., 512 N.W.2d 675, 677 (N.D. 1994); Habeck v.
MacDonald, 520 N.W.2d 808, 811 (N.D. 1994).
140. Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1263 (N.J. 1985)
(citing Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 628).
141. Id. at 1268 (quoting Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292
N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich. 1980)).
142. Jones v. Cent. Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 786 (Alaska 1989).
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143

in 1993. Typifying Professor David Walsh’s contention that many
courts cited cases to “legitimate” or serve as cover for their own
rulings in a new area of law, the Ohio Court of Appeals quoted
both Pine River and Toussaint while holding that an employer’s
144
The
promise to pay severance to its employees was binding.
Wyoming Supreme Court first recognized that a handbook could
modify the presumptive employment at-will relationship in 1985
145
When the issue reappeared in 1994, the
and cited Toussaint.
146
In 2000, it cited Pine
court quoted Toussaint multiple times.
147
River’s repudiation of the mutuality of obligation argument. The
Maryland Court of Special Appeals quoted Pine River on the
formation of contracts and its admonition that “general statements
of policy are no more than that and do not meet the contractual
148
requirements for an offer” ; however, it also quoted Toussaint at
length and described that opinion as having the “best exposition”
of the view that an employer’s pronouncements may create legally
149
enforceable obligations.
In his study of the citation practices of state courts in wrongful
discharge cases, which included contract actions, public policy
retaliatory discharge cases, and suits involving the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, Professor Walsh saw that very few courts
explicitly stated that they relied upon the ruling of another court;
he noticed that when such statements were made, they “tended to
150
be scattered about rather than directed at one or a few courts.”
However, he found one exception to this pattern:
143. Hartbarger v. Frank Paxton Co., 857 P.2d 776, 781, 786 (N.M. 1993) (“We
find the reasoning of Toussaint and similar cases persuasive.”).
144. Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 765, 772–73 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
Helle was cited with approval by the Ohio Supreme Court when it recognized that
the at-will doctrine could be modified by implied or express contract. Mers v.
Dispatch Printing Co., 483 N.E.2d 150, 154 (Ohio 1985).
145. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 707 (Wyo. 1985).
146. Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 217–18
(Wyo. 1994).
147. Worley v. Wyo. Bottling Co., 1 P.3d 615, 623 (Wyo. 2000) (citing Pine
River, 333 N.W.2d at 629).
148. Staggs v. Blue Cross of Md., Inc., 486 A.2d 798, 802, 804 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1985).
149. Id. at 802. The court later quoted Pine River again in MacGill v. Blue Cross
of Maryland, Inc., 551 A.2d 501, 503 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989). The Maryland
Supreme Court eventually held that handbooks may constitute a unilateral
contract and cited both Pine River and Toussaint in its analysis. Suburban Hosp.,
Inc., v. Dwiggins, 596 A.2d 1069, 1075 (Md. 1991).
150. Walsh, supra note 31, at 354.
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The main exception in this regard is the Minnesota
Supreme Court, whose decision in Pine River State Bank
v. Mettille (1983) was cited as particularly influential by all
of the courts that made such a statement in an implied
contract precedent case. Other courts seemed to be
impressed by the manner in which that decision, while
adopting a new wrongful discharge doctrine, was firmly
151
couched in the familiar discourse of contract law.
This is exactly why Justice Souter sided with Pine River in his
meticulous survey of the case law.
X. PINE RIVER IN THE LAW REVIEWS
Law reviews serve the legal profession in many ways. They are
a forum for serious scholarship, commentary, and debate; they
monitor the activities of the United States Supreme Court
especially closely, if not obsessively; and they sometimes critique the
decisions of state supreme courts. For our purposes, the reviews
are important for another reason: they are a sensitive barometer of
judicial innovation. As in other disciplines, originality, a break with
the status quo, is noted in professional journals.
The following chart lists the number of times American law
152
reviews cited Pine River from 1983 through 2005.
Law Review Citations
16
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20
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20
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95
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93
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19
89
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87
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83

0

151. Id. at 360 n.17.
152. For our methodology, see supra note 111 and accompanying text.
Monthly publications of county and state bar associations in Minnesota are not
included.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006

33

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 6
7. HEDIN - RC - REFORMAT 3.DOC

330

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

11/20/2006 3:27:34 PM

[Vol. 33:1

From 1983 through 2005, Pine River was cited in 185 separate
law review articles. Only one article was a narrow case note in a law
153
The rest
review published by a law school in Minnesota.
concerned developments in the common law of employment
contracts in individual jurisdictions as well as a wide range of other
employment-related subjects. The sheer number of these articles
attests to the upheaval in employment relations caused by the
employee rights movement during this period. The decade
spanning the 1990s, when Pine River was cited with consistently high
frequency, coincides with the emergence of employment law as a
legal specialty.
It has been said of Benjamin Cardozo that he “cultivated
154
academics.”
Cardozo cited four times more scholarly articles in
his opinions than his colleagues on the New York Court of
155
Appeals, and he wrote three famous books on the law, each
156
published by a university press. It could never be said that Justice
Simonett set out to curry favor with academia. Nevertheless, he
admired law reviews, and he saw that the bench benefited from
157
their critiques. He was the President of the Minnesota Law Review
in the 1950–1951 school year. In an interview after being
appointed, he remarked with evident pride about the Minnesota
158
Within a few years after his
Law Review, “Volume 34 is mine.”
153. Sarah C. Steefel, Note, At-Will Employment--Contractual Limitation of an
Employer’s Right to Terminate: Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622
(Minn. 1983), 7 HAMLINE L. REV. 463 (1984).
154. RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 135 (1990).
Anyone who reads this insightful book quickly realizes that it contains almost as
much Posner-on-Posner as Posner-on-Cardozo.
155. Id.
156. THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); THE GROWTH OF THE LAW
(1924); and THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE (1928).
157. Speech to the University of Minnesota Law Review on April 11, 1986, in
THE JUDICIAL CAREER OF JOHN E. SIMONETT (Marvin Roger Anderson & Susan K.
Larson, eds., 1998) (Minnesota Justices Series No. 11) (“We need the informed
criticism and comment of the bar to tell us what we have said and to put our
opinions in perspective. Here law reviews are of immense help. Law reviews
provide a forum for objective and reflective criticism of appellate decision-making.
Judges tend to be generalists, and we need the view of scholars and experts in the
particular field. Our opinions are bound by the facts of a particular case, and we
find it helpful for law reviews, which can treat a problem more abstractly, to
explore the theoretical underpinnings of our rulings. Knowing that our opinions
are being written not just for the litigants but for a broader sophisticated audience
serves as a healthy discipline and, as Lord Bryce observed, helps to keep the courts
from ‘immersion in the turbid pool of politics.’”).
158. Heidenreich, supra note 73, at 9.
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retirement, he could walk through the stacks of the library of any
law school and point to hundreds of bound volumes of law reviews
containing references to his opinions.
XI. THE UNEXPECTED AFTERMATH OF PINE RIVER
What appears incremental in Pine River masked seismic
change. Simonett’s reexamination of the at-will employment
relationship within the parameters of traditional contract law
encouraged a major attack on the rule a few years later, this one
sounding in tort. In 1986, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
recognized the so-called “public policy exception” to the at-will
159
The court noted that the Minnesota Supreme Court,
rule.
beginning in Pine River, had created an “implied-in-fact contract
160
exception.”
From there the appeals court easily carved out
another “exception”—an employee who is fired for refusing to
161
The
break a law has a tort claim for retaliatory discharge.
162
legislature quickly enacted a statute on the subject, and when this

159. Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 396 N.W.2d 588, 591–93 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986) (citing Petermann v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 334 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1959), among others). The phrase “exception to the at-will rule” was not
used by Simonett when he discussed unilateral contracts in Pine River; instead, he
very carefully and pointedly stated that the at-will rule is “only a rule of contract
construction.” 333 N.W.2d at 628. The description of Pine River’s contract analysis
as an “exception to employment at will” first appeared in Lewis v. Equitable Life
Assurance Society, 389 N.W.2d 876, 882 (Minn. 1986). The appeals court repeated
the phrase a few months later in Phipps. 396 N.W.2d at 591. In the following
years, Simonett’s pragmatic holding that the at-will rule is only a means of
interpreting employment contracts is rarely mentioned by Minnesota trial courts
or the appeals court; instead, the rule, or “doctrine” as it is sometimes labeled, has
been restored to near-substantive-law status and challenges to it are mechanically
placed within several firm classifications—promissory estoppel, contract,
whistleblower, and so on.
160. 396 N.W.2d at 590.
161. Id. at 593 (“[W]e believe that a public policy exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine would assist in maintaining the integrity and
limitations of other causes of action. Rather than attempting to reach a grievous
wrong, repugnant to an ordered society, through the artificial expansion of other
doctrines, it is preferable to recognize it in its individual posture.” (citation
omitted)).
162. MINN. STAT. § 181.932 (2004) (originally enacted as Act of May 11, 1987,
ch. 76, sec. 2, 1987 Minn. Laws 140 (prohibiting certain terminations)).
Retaliatory discharge suits against government entities under the Minnesota
Whistleblower Act frequently include a separate count alleging denial of the
employee’s First Amendment free speech rights. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391
U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
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case came before the supreme court, it affirmed that such a
163
retaliatory discharge called for tort remedies.
From the late 1980s through the end of the next decade, there
was a tsunami of sexual harassment litigation against all sizes and
shapes of American businesses. Many of these civil rights suits
164
included common law tort claims such as defamation, assault and
165
166
In still
battery, and intentional infliction of mental distress.
other cases, dismissed employees resurrected tort theories such as
167
and intentional
fraud in the inducement to the contract
168
misrepresentation and alleged them in workplace litigation that
would have been summarily dismissed before Pine River. In
addition, Pine River, a common law contract action, reaffirmed the
importance of the employer’s own rules in litigation under civil
169
rights legislation.
163. Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp, 408 N.W.2d 569, 571 (Minn. 1987)
(Scott, J.). The Whistleblower Act confounded the intermediate court for the
next fifteen years. Finally in 2002, much of the gloss that had been slathered on
this legislation was removed by the supreme court in Anderson-Johanningmeier v.
Mid-Minnesota Women’s Center, Inc., 637 N.W.2d 270, 277 (Minn. 2002) (employee
who reports suspected violation of law need not prove that law implicates “public
policy”), and in Abraham v. County of Hennepin, 639 N.W.2d 342, 354 (Minn. 2002)
(employees alleging dismissals violated Whistleblower Act and Minnesota
Occupational Safety and Health Act (MOSHA) were entitled to jury trials and tort
remedies).
164. See Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1990) (sexual
harassment and defamation). The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the tort
of defamation by self-publication in Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 389
N.W.2d 876, 886–88 (Minn. 1986) (employee recovered for both breach of
contract and defamation).
165. See Johnson v. Ramsey County, 424 N.W.2d 800, 808–10 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988) (recovery for assault and battery, the statute of limitations for harassment
under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) having passed).
166. In addition, sexual harassment plaintiffs began pleading torts claims such
as negligent hiring, negligent retention, and negligent supervision, but these have
not fared well. Compare Timothy P. Glynn, The Limited Viability of Negligent
Supervision, Retention, Hiring, and Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims in Employment
Discrimination Cases in Minnesota, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 581 (1998), with
Richard A. Ross, How Exclusive is the Exclusivity Provision of the Minnesota Human
Rights Act?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1063 (2000).
167. Brooks v. Doherty, Rumble & Butler, 481 N.W.2d 120 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992).
168. Hanks v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 493 N.W.2d 302 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
169. One of the classic pieces of circumstantial evidence of disparate treatment
is proof that the employer violated its own policies when it engaged in the
challenged activity. The cases discussing this proof are legion. See Muldrew v.
Anheuser Busch, 554 F. Supp. 808, 810 (E.D. Mo. 1982), aff’d, 728 F.2d 989 (8th
Cir. 1984) (arguing that application of a policy different than company’s written
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Finally, as evidence of the common law’s ability to regenerate,
the concept of additional consideration that was used by the
170
supreme court to give relief to Rev. Bussard and that Simonett
relegated to a “presumption” in construing employment contracts
171
in Pine River reappeared in an important corner of corporate
law—involving employment disputes between shareholders of close
corporations. In a series of cases the Minnesota Appeals Court has
interpreted the Minnesota Business Corporation Act to give
protection to shareholder-employees who invest capital in the new
enterprise—in other words, provide “additional consideration” to
their employer—against oppression (i.e., arbitrary discharge) by
172
those in control.
Simonett’s description of the evidentiary
policy is evidence of pretext); Clymore v. Far-Mar-Co., 709 F.2d 499, 503–04 (8th
Cir. 1983) (finding salary discrimination where plaintiff’s wages were below the
salary guidelines for her position); EEOC v. Minneapolis Elec. Steel Casting Co.,
552 F. Supp. 957, 964 (D. Minn. 1982) (noting that a failure to uniformly enforce
unwritten safety policies can be evidence of discriminatory treatment). The theory
underlying this proof is that the employee who is not given the benefit of the
employer’s policies on discharge, promotion, etc., is denied “employment
opportunities” afforded other employees. In civil rights litigation where this
evidence is offered, it is not necessary to prove that the employer’s personnel
policy in question satisfies Pine River’s high standards for the formation of a
unilateral contract.
170. Bussard v. Coll. of St. Thomas, 294 Minn. 215, 200 N.W.2d 155 (1972).
171. 333 N.W.2d 622, 628 (Minn. 1983). An employee who provides
additional consideration to the employer is “presumed” to have an employment
contract terminable for cause. In such a situation, the burden is on the employer
to rebut the presumption of heightened job security.
172. In determining whether a shareholder-employee had a “reasonable
expectation” of job security, which is the standard in Minnesota Statutes, section
302A.751, subdivision 3a (2004)—in other words, whether that employment was
not terminable at the whim of those controlling the corporation, and whether all
other shareholders had the same understanding—the appeals court in Haley v.
Forcelee, 669 N.W.2d 48, 60 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003), listed four factors, the first of
which was “whether the shareholder made a capital investment in the company.”
Cf. Gunderson v. Alliance of Computer Prof’ls, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 173, 190 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2001) (“[A]n employee who has no capital investment in the corporation
but either buys a small percentage of stock through periodic company offerings or
receives a small percentage of stock as part of a compensation package most likely
lacks a reasonable expectation of employment.”). See also Harris v. Mardan Bus.
Sys. Inc., 421 N.W.2d 350, 353 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (affirming dismissal of an
employee-shareholder’s wrongful discharge suit and noting that the employee
received stock as compensation). In this state, at least since 1896, an employee’s
investment of capital in the employer has been recognized as a form of “additional
consideration” sufficient to give that investor-shareholder-employee a job
terminable only for cause. McMullan v. Dickinson, 63 Minn. 405, 407–09, 65 N.W.
661, 662 (1896). In Pine River, Simonett cited two cases in his analysis of
additional consideration, and both involved employees who had “invested” in their
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significance of the old common law concept of “additional
consideration” in Pine River permeates the law of entrepreneurship
in the state of Minnesota.
Similar developments in the law of employment relations—a
relaxation of the “at-will rule” of contract construction and,
simultaneously, a willingness by the judiciary to grant new remedies
for unfairness in the workplace to employees—occurred in every
state in the nation in the late 1980s and 1990s. By century’s end,
the employee rights movement had reached maturity; yet,
significantly, it had not in any demonstrable manner impaired the
ability of management to make decisions on allocation of capital,
restructuring, product development, and every other matter
necessary to keep the enterprise competitive, efficient, and
functioning.
XII. THE BIRTH OF A NEW DISCIPLINE
By the end of the 1980s, the outlines of employment law as a
distinct legal discipline were emerging. This was part of the
movement toward specialization in the legal profession that
Simonett had noted in Nordling, a trend encouraged by the removal
of ethical restrictions on lawyer advertising.
Many legal specialties work with one piece of legislation or
even subparts of an act—the bankruptcy act, the tax code, the
criminal code, and so on. While civil rights laws such as Title VII,
the Equal Pay Act, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
required specialized knowledge, the civil rights bar was too small
and fragmented to form a separate discipline within the profession
in the 1960s and 1970s. This began to change with the erosion of
the at-will rule in the 1980s, its transformation from a rule of
substantive law to one of common law contract construction, and
the recognition in most jurisdictions of the “public policy” tort of
retaliatory discharge. And then Congress acted. With the passage
of three major pieces of legislation in the early 1990s—the
Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), the 1991
Amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provided for
jury trials and expanded remedies for victims of intentional
discrimination, and finally the Family and Medical Leave Act of

employers, thereby giving them job security: Littell v. Evening Star Newspaper Co.,
120 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1941) and Drzewiecki v. H & R Block, Inc., 101 Cal. Rptr. 169
(Ct. App. 1972). 333 N.W.2d at 629.
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1993 (FMLA)—employment law as a specialty within the profession
173
came into being.
Within the profession, lawyers began to identify themselves as
“employment lawyers.” Labor law firms that were once pegged as
“management” or “union” learned they had to provide additional
services to their clients in the areas of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA), the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA), Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and
many state employment laws. In similar fashion, civil rights lawyers
174
were quick to expand their services.
The legal departments of
large corporations had specialists on employment law who handled
routine in-house matters and, occasionally, defended litigation
against their employer-client as well.
One characteristic of specialties is that they have their own
professional organizations and honor societies. In 1976, the
National Employment Law Institute was formed to educate
corporate lawyers and managers about Equal Employment
175
Opportunity (EEO) matters.
It quickly expanded its mission to
include wage and hour laws, occupational safety, employee
benefits, wrongful discharge, and compliance with the federal laws
of the early 1990s. In 1985, the National Employment Lawyers
173. The evolution of “human resources” into a specialized area of
management parallels that of employment law. Employees in this area were once
known as benefits coordinators. As such, they handled pension, retirement and
wage and hour matters; but, in the civil rights era, their duties came to encompass
EEO compliance, affirmative action duties, sexual harassment training,
development of reasonable accommodations under the ADA, administration of
the FMLA, as well as administration of the company’s own internal rules. As
professionally trained human resources managers in large corporations, they too
had their own journals, organizations, continuing education courses, and ethical
standards. As with employment law, the roots of human resources, as a profession,
lie in 1960s civil rights legislation.
174. At the beginning of the 1980s, the civil rights bar, an extremely small
segment of the profession, represented non-union employees in discrimination
claims against their employers. Because intentional discrimination is hard to
prove and less prevalent than many think, they could offer no assistance to most
potential clients who had been treated arbitrarily or unfairly but not
discriminatorily. Thus, when the first cracks in the facade of the at-will rule were
exposed, these lawyers seized the opportunity and resurrected old common law
theories and pressed newly recognized ones, frequently in conjunction with
allegations of discrimination. Lawyers representing unions did not have similar
urgings to advance the emerging rights of unorganized workers, though as the
employee rights movement gained momentum in the early 1990s, they too took on
many of these cases.
175. National Employment Law Institute, http://www.neli.org (last visited Oct.
12, 2006).
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Association (NELA) was formed to benefit lawyers representing
employees in statutory and common-law claims against their
176
employers. The Minnesota chapter of NELA was formed in 1990.
An honorary society, The College of Labor and Employment
Lawyers, headquartered in Washington, D.C., was founded in 1995
on the 60th anniversary of the National Labor Relations Board and
177
the 30th anniversary of Title VII and Executive Order 11246.
Specialties also have their own literature. The managementsponsored Employee Relations Law Journal, started in 1975, originally
dealt with labor, EEO, and pension issues, but it soon encompassed
developments in wrongful discharge law and newly enacted federal
legislation. The Industrial Relations Law Journal, founded in 1976,
changed its title to Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law in
1993. The American Bar Association’s The Labor Lawyer was started
in 1985; it is sub-headed, “A Journal of Ideas and Developments in
Labor and Employment Law.” The Employee Rights and Employment
Policy Journal, affiliated with the Chicago-Kent College of Law, was
founded in 1997, and the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Labor
and Employment Law was started the following year.
Law schools began to teach courses on employment law, and
they were separate from classes on labor law and employment
discrimination.
During the 1987–88 school year, Professor
Deborah Schmedemann taught the first course in employment law
178
at William Mitchell College of Law.
In the fall semester of 1988,
Professor Stephen F. Befort taught the first class at the University of
179
Minnesota Law School.
Finally, as the ultimate proof of the emergence of the new
discipline, a change was made in the hallowed Key-Number System.
In 2004, Thompson Publishing Company, the successor of West,
eliminated “Master and Servant” and “Labor Relations” and
merged them into a new classification: “Labor and Employment.”

176. NELA was first known as the Plaintiff Employment Lawyers Association. It
changed its name in 1990.
177. The College of Labor and Employment Lawyers, Inc., http://
www.laborandemploymentcollege.org/ (enter the site; then follow “About the
College” hyperlink)(last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
178. WILLIAM MITCHELL COLLEGE OF LAW, BULLETIN/CATALOG 40 (1987).
179. E-mail from Stephen F. Befort, Professor of Law, University of Minnesota
Law School, to Douglas Hedin, Lawyer (July 28, 2006, 12:32:35 CST) (on file with
author).
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XIII. CONCLUSION
Just as biographers must not identify themselves too closely
with their subjects, giving them an influence they do not deserve,
so also should a study of a particular court case not overstate its
importance. And so, while Pine River was significant, and that can
be documented, its influence really derives from being the most
important member of the trio. It was the trio—Toussaint, Weiner,
and Pine River itself—decided separately yet reinforcing one
another—that launched the first major successful assault on the
citadel, one that was warmly received by most other state supreme
courts. They changed the common law of employment relations in
this country and were midwives to the birth of a new discipline—
employment law.
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